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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         The United States Army Corps of Engineers prohibited 
the use of the landowners' coal loading facility and coal tipple 
because they posed a danger to navigation on the Monongahela 
River.  The landowners now seek just compensation for the 
deprivation of the use of their property under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution and Section 111 of the River and 
Harbors Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C.  595a (1988).  Because the 
navigational servitude was a preexisting limitation on the 
landowners' title to riparian land, we hold the Corps' exercise 
of the servitude to prohibit the use of the landowners' property 
was not a taking under the Fifth Amendment or Section 111. 
                          I.  Background 
         James Filiaggi and others (the "landowners") owned 
132.55 acres on the Monongahela River in Greene County, 
Pennsylvania.  A coal loading facility was located on the tract, 
and a coal tipple, grounded on the property, extended 
approximately one hundred feet into the Monongahela River.  The 
tipple and coal loading facility have been used for loading coal 
into barges since 1914. 
         On January 7, 1992, in connection with the Grays 
Landing Lock and Dam Project, the United States, on behalf of the 
Army Corps of Engineers, filed a complaint and declaration of 
taking in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania.  The United States acquired 30.54 acres 
of the landowners' tract at a cost of $86,700.  The Government 
did not acquire the remaining 102 acres of the tract on which the 
coal loading facility was located and on which the tipple was 
grounded. 
         Although the United States acquired neither the coal 
loading facility nor the tipple, the Army Corps of Engineers 
subsequently prohibited their operation.  The Corps of Engineers 
concluded: 
         the loading and unloading of the barges at 
         the tipple site will [create a hazard to 
         navigation].  Due to the close proximity of 
         the tipple to the lock and dam (approximately 
         1,000 ft.) the operation of the coal loading 
         facility poses a safety hazard to the river 
         boat pilots who would be required to maneuver 
         in and about it and about the danger zone of 
         the lock and dam.  The operation of the 
         facility also poses a hazard to the operation 
         of the lock and dam.  Specifically, if a 
         barge or a river boat were to break away, 
         there would be little if any response time to 
         prevent it from going over the dam or causing 
         damage thereto.  The Corps of Engineers is 
         responsible for the control and regulation of 
         the navigation of the Monongahela River.  It 
         will not permit coal loading operations to 
         continue in the area of the tipple. 
App. at 47-48. 
         The landowners sought over $300,000 in compensation for 
the loss of the use of the tipple, coal loading facility, and the 
remaining 102 acres in the district court.  They argued the 
Government's prohibition on the use of the tipple and coal 
loading facility resulted in a taking by depriving them of all 
economically reasonable use of their remaining 102 acres.  SeeLucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  
They also argued that Section 111 of the River and Harbors Act 
mandates a determination of compensation for the remaining tract 
based upon its use as a coal loading facility for barges. 
         On the United States' motion for summary judgment, the 
district court held that the United States did not take the 
landowners' property by prohibiting the use of the tipple and 
coal loading facility.  See Memorandum Opinion, United States v. 
30.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Greene County, 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 92-33, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Pa. 
March 15, 1995).  Rather, it concluded, the United States had 
regulated the use of a navigable river under the "navigational" 
servitude, and although economic loss resulted, no compensation 
was due.  Id. at 5-6.  The district court also held that Section 
111 of the River and Harbors Act does not apply to regulation of 
navigable waterways under the navigational servitude, id. at 7, 
and therefore the landowners were not entitled to compensation. 
         The district court had jurisdiction over this eminent 
domain action under 28 U.S.C.  1358.  We have jurisdiction over 
final orders of the district court under 28 U.S.C.  1291.   
              Our review of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment is plenary.  Western United Life Assur. Co. v. 
Hayden, 64 F.3d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1995). 
                         II.  Discussion 
         A.   The "Navigational Servitude" and Compensation for 
              Takings of Riparian Land 
         The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires the payment of just compensation for private property 
taken for public use.  U.S. Const. Amend. 5.  But the United 
States is not constitutionally required to pay for economic 
losses resulting from the exercise of its "navigational" 
servitude--its power to regulate the use of navigable waterways-- 
because navigable waterways have always been under the exclusive 
control of the federal government under the Commerce Clause.  As 
stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 
121 (1967): 
         The Commerce Clause confers a unique position 
         upon the Government in connection with 
         navigable waters. . . . [T]hey are the public 
         property of the nation, and subject to all 
         the requisite legislation by Congress.  This 
         power to regulate navigation confers upon the 
         United States a "dominant servitude," which 
         extends to the entire stream and the stream 
         bed below the ordinary high-water mark.  The 
         proper exercise of this power is not an 
         invasion of any private property rights in 
         the stream or the lands underlying it, for 
         the damage sustained does not result from 
         taking property from riparian owners within 
         the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from 
         the lawful exercise of a power to which the 
         interests of riparian owners have always been 
         subject.  Thus, without being 
         constitutionally obligated to pay 
         compensation, the United States may change 
         the course of a navigable stream or otherwise 
         impair of destroy a riparian owner's access 
         to navigable waters, even though the market 
         value of the riparian owner's land is 
         substantially diminished. 
Id. at 122-23 (citations omitted); see also Owen v. United 
States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
         The navigational servitude does not relieve the 
Government of its obligation to pay just compensation for takings 
of fastlands above the high-water mark.  But the Constitution 
"permits the Government to disregard the value arising from [the] 
fact of riparian location in compensating the owner when fast 
lands are appropriated."  United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. at 
123-24.  The value of land that arises from its riparian location 
"does not inhere in these parcels," "but depends on use of water 
to which the [landowner] has no right as against the United 
States."  Id. at 124. 
         Congress can, of course, provide relief where the 
exercise of the navigational servitude causes economic loss, even 
though the United States is not constitutionally required to pay 
compensation.  One instance of congressional action to grant such 
relief is Section 111 of the River and Harbors Act of 1970, 33 
U.S.C.  595a.  Section 111 provides that in cases of takings of 
above the high-water mark real property, just compensation will 
be calculated on the basis of a tract's riparian location, even 
though United States v. Rands makes clear that the Constitution 
does not require consideration of the tract's location.  Section 
111 provides, in relevant part: 
         In all cases where real property shall be 
         taken by the United States for the public use 
         in connection with any improvement of rivers, 
         harbors, canals, or waterways of the United 
         States, and in all condemnation proceedings 
         by the United States to acquire lands or 
         easements for such improvements, the 
         compensation to be paid for real property 
         taken by the United States above the normal 
         high water mark of navigable waters of the 
         United States shall be the fair market value 
         of such real property based upon all uses to 
         which such real property may reasonably be 
         put, including its highest and best use, any 
         of which uses may be dependent upon access to 
         or utilization of such navigable waters. 
33 U.S.C.  595a.  While Section 111 alters the method of 
calculation of just compensation for takings of above high-water 
mark riparian land, it does not alter the underlying 
determination of what constitutes a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Nor does Section 111 alter any other aspect of 
established law on the navigational servitude. 
         B.   Takings under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
              Council 
         The landowners argue that the Government's prohibition 
on the use of the tipple and coal loading facility stripped the 
102 acres remaining in their possession of all economically 
reasonable uses.  Relying on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), they assert that this prohibition 
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
         Lucas established that economic regulations can result 
in a taking, even though the Government does not formally condemn 
property.  "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called 
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of 
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically 
idle, he has suffered a taking."  Id. at 1019 (emphasis in 
original).  But Lucas also noted that when "the logically 
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows 
that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to 
begin with," id. at 1027, regulations proscribing such uses do 
not result in a taking. 
         The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the 
navigational servitude as a pre-existing limitation on riparian 
landowners' estates.  See id. at 1028-29 (citing the navigational 
servitude as a case when "we assuredly would permit the 
government to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing 
limitation upon the landowner's title.") (emphasis in original).  
Because the navigational servitude is a pre-existing limitation 
on the title of riparian property--indeed the limitation is 
almost as old as the republic itself, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 189-193 (1824)--exercise of the servitude 
cannot constitute a taking, even where it deprives a landowner of 
all economically reasonable use of his land.  United States v. 
Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 704 (1987) ("the damage 
sustained does not result from taking property from riparian 
owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the 
lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian 
owners have always been subject"); United States v. Rands, 389 
U.S. at 122 (same).  Accordingly, even were the landowners to 
establish that the Government's prohibition on the use of the 
tipple and coal loading facility deprived them of all 
economically reasonable uses of their land (and they have not yet 
established this fact), there was no taking.  From the time the 
tipple and coal-loading facility commenced operation in 1914, the 
landowners' right to operate them was subject to the navigational 
servitude and the possibility that the Government might exercise 
the servitude to prohibit their use.  Exercise of the servitude 
did nothing more than realize a limitation always inherent in the 
landowners' title.  It was not a taking. 
         C.  Section 111 of the River and Harbors Act of 1970 
         The landowners argue that Section 111 of the River and 
Harbors Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C.  595a, requires the Government to 
compensate them for the prohibition on the use of the tipple and 
coal loading facility.  They note that Section 111 applies to 
condemnation proceedings and to "cases where real property shall 
be taken . . . for the public use in connection with any 
improvement of rivers."  They assert the Government's prohibition 
on the use of the tipple and coal loading facility was a "taking" 
within the meaning of Section 111. 
         There is no reason to suppose that Congress referred to 
takings in Section 111 in any other than a constitutional sense.  
As discussed, the Government's exercise of the navigational 
servitude to prohibit the use of the tipple and coal loading 
facility was not a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  
Accordingly, it would appear that Section 111, by its terms, does 
not apply. 
         In any event, Section 111 only applies to "real 
property taken by the United States above the high water mark."  
Here the United States did not acquire above the high-water mark 
real property (other than the original 30.54 acres); rather, it 
prohibited use of the tipple--a structure jutting one hundred 
feet into a navigable waterway.  Section 111 does not require 
compensation for prohibition of the use of such a structure.  Cf.United 
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, Etc. (City of Valdez), 
666 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982) ("private improvements 
connected to fastlands but located in the navigable waters may be 
altered or removed by the Government to improve navigation 
without compensating the owner"). 
         The landowners also argue that Section 111 "was adopted 
to limit or abrogate the harsh provisions of the earlier doctrine 
of the `navigational servitude,'" and therefore the navigational 
servitude does excuse payment of just compensation.  But Congress 
did not express an intent to abolish the navigational servitude 
or to provide compensation for all economic losses occasioned by 
regulation of navigable waterways.  The legislative history of 
Section 111 indicates that Congress intended to modify the rule 
of United States v. Rands only to the extent of paying full 
compensation based on riparian location in cases of actual 
acquisition of above the high-water mark real property.  Section 
111 "makes no change in existing law" with respect to other 
aspects of the navigational servitude.  H. R. Rep. No. 1665, 91st 
Cong. 2d Sess. 30-31 (1970).  We will not alter long-established 
law or abridge the navigational servitude in the absence of 
explicit legislation from Congress. 
                         III.  Conclusion 
         The Government's exercise of the navigational servitude 
to prohibit use of the tipple and coal loading facility did not 
result in a taking of the landowners' property.  The navigational 
servitude was always a limitation inherent in the landowners' 
title, and therefore exercise of the servitude was not a taking. 
         Nor was there a taking within the meaning of Section 
111 of the River and Harbors Act.  Its provisions do not apply.  
We will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
